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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XVIII FEBRUARY, 1933 NUMBER 2
RATIFICATION AFTER LOSS IN FIRE
INSURANCE
G. H. ROBINSON*
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of January i6th an insurance broker in San
Francisco, acting without authority from the property owner,
secured from an insurance company "binders" on the Paramount
Famous Lasky plant near Los Angeles. These binders recited that
they covered the property from ten A. M. and from noon, January
16th. On January 16th at 4:30 P. M. a fire swept the plant. On
January 23rd the property owner "ratified", and it was later decided
that the property owner could recover on the policy.' Following a
strictly "hunch jurisprudence" the court gives no indication that2
it was dealing with a problem on which there is controversy. It cites
no case on post-fire ratification. Yet the American Law Institute's
Restatement of Agency has a section on the topic; and there are
decisions on it, both in this country's courts and in those of England
which are in disagreement with each other.
Ratification in general is not the subject of this paper. It will
concern itself only with ratification after loss in insurance and then
only in fire insurance cases, in which the Courts have handled the
matter as an insurance problem in terms of insurance utility rather
than in terms of strict agency law. In insurance the problem may
present itself in several guises. A friend's kindness may raise it
in behalf of an absent neighbor whose house has somehow been
left uninsured. An official of a corporation who has nothing to
do with insuring its property, or a stockholder, may discover that
those who have to do with getting insurance on the corporation's
property have not attended to the job, and seek immediate cover-
age in behalf of the corporation. An ex-employee, still friendly to
his former employer, may recall how careless "the boss" always
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
'Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corporation,
5o F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
2See J. C. Hutcheson Jr., 27we Judgment Intuitive-Tfie Function of the 'Hunch'
in Judicial Decisions (1929) 14 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 274.
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was about his insurance matters and seek to do him a good turn.
An insurance broker may use the high-pressure salesmanship of get-
ting the policy issued before seeking to sell it to the property owner.
The ordinary case where an insurance agent renews a policy and
hands it, with the bill for it, to a client seems also to be within the
spirit of the problem. Many courts find it involved in the every day
instance in which a property owner simply asks an insurance agent to
get him protection without specifying in what company. If the
agent delivers a policy in the "A" Company and later switches the
business to the "B" Company and has not notified the property
owner before a fire, these courts read the property owners efforts to
solve his resulting predicament in terms of ratification.
Prior to loss the property owner-in familiar symbol "P"-may
ratify "A" the self appointed "agent's" act, and take the benefit of
the insurance. No one disputes this.' But have the magic words
"I ratify" lost their magic after the fire has occurred? This question
the writer will attempt to answer. The American Law Institute's
Restatement of Agency asserts that the words "I ratify" have lost
their magic.4 The decision stated at the opening of this paper says
they have not. On the surface of neither pronouncement is the prop-
erty owner's knowledge of the occurrence of the loss of any relevancy.
But the Restatement at least makes it a part of the problem.' In the
following discussion the writer has satisfied himself that the courts
"judgment intuitive" in the Paramount case is in accord with the
American judicial authorities. With less confidence he is inclined to
the belief that on the whole the American doctrine is also the prefer-
able solution on principle.6
$THE RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 83, sets out the doctrines.4See page 175 infra for § i i6.
5Under § I6 is "illustration (b)": "A purporting to represent P, but without
authority, makes a contract to insure P's house. The house burns to P's knowl-
edge. P then affirms. There is no insurance."
6In the periodical literature on ratification as revealed by the digests of the
American law reviews, the paper most thoroughly in point is that of F. T. Case, A
Question of Ratification of Insurance Law (1907) I9G GREEN BAG 93. Mr. Case who
deals with post-fire ratification, specifically, opens with the concession that
insurance attorneys believe that ratification may be after loss: that the texts so
state and that the courts so hold. He wrote prior to more outstanding decisions
on the topic and did not mention others already on the books. A note on his
paper appears in (1907) 2o HARv. L. REv. 5o4. Its comments are on the whole
adverse to his position that no ratification should be allowed. The note con-
cludes that "The text writers lay down the law contrary to lMr. Case's view
and the language of the cases they commonly cite supports them." Notes on
ratification topics applying to the cases cited herein are in the foot notes to this
paper.
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I. RATIFICATION AFTER FII LOSS-ON THE AUTHORITIES
(a) American Decisions and Texts
Marqusee v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.7 in the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals at New York City is the outstanding
American decision.8 The Hartford Company issued the policy on
March 16th when the self-appointed agent asked for it, and left
it at the property owner's warehouse. The fire came three days
later and within a week after that, the self-appointed agent tendered
the premium,9 which the insurer refused. On April 3oth the insurance
company wrote to the property owner: "This is to notify you that
the paper you hold purporting to be a policy.., is not.., a con-
tract; ... this company hereby specifically denies liability under
such a policy."
In a suit on the policy the trial judge10 directed for the insurance
company on grounds he had already taken in a prior case" on the
same facts. Finding that McIntosh, the self-appointed agent, had
On ratification in general see: E. Wambaugh, A Problem as to Ratification
(1895) 9 HARV. L. Rnv. 6o, discussing the Boulton Partners case on which see
infra, note 15; E. Mechem, Effect of Ratification as Between Principal and Third
Party (1904) 4 MICH. L. REV. 269, accepting the possibility of ratification after
loss. (p. 279); E. G. Goddard, Ratification by an Undisclsed Principal (1903) 2
MICH. L. REV. 25; Corbin, Ratification Without Knowledge of Material Facts
(19o6) 15YALEL.J.33I.
7198 Fed. 475 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912) certiorari denied, 229 U. S. 621, 33 Sup. Ct.
1049 (1912). It was not generally noted in the law reviews, possibly because they
had noted Kline Bros. v. Royal Ins. Co., 192 Fed. 378 (S. D. N. Y., 1911), infra
note ii.
$In 198 Fed. 1O43 the circuit court of appeals in rehearing said "the trial judge,
directed a verdict in favor of the defendant which the majority of this court held
should be reversed, so that the plaintiff, if able to do so, could on a new trial prove
that the insured had ratified the unauthorized contract made by McIntosh
before the insurer withdrew.****Further examination of therecord shows that no
such proof was offered and that if offered, it could not have been received, because
the parties had stipulated to confine the proof to the agreed statement of facts. * *
As the record shows no error on this point, the mandate must be amended so as to
affirm the judgment." See however Marqusee v. Ins. Co. of North America
infra p. 17o and note 41.
9The fact that he did so without authority saved the day in the end for the
insurer in another case arising out of the same facts. See infra page 171.
10Learned Hand, then District Judge.
"In Kline Bros. v. Royal Insurance Co., 192 Fed. 378 (S. D. N. Y., 1911).
Judge Hand's discussion of the ratification problem will be found at page 386 et
seq. He does not mention Grover v. Matthews, (1910) 2 K. B. 4oi, which is here-
after discussed (page x65) and which the Court of Appeals in the Marqsee case
remarks "fully sustained the view of the court below" (198 Fed. at 477).
The case in 192 Fed. 378 was noted in (1912) 25 HARV. L. REV. 729, 735-
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no authority to make the contract for Kline Brothers and Co., the
property owners, he concluded that the latter could not ratify after
the fire. The fact finding, the Circuit Court of Appeals accepted.
It completely disagreed with the trial court's conclusion as to its legal
result. Reversing the defendant's judgment, Judge Ward said:12
"What shocks us at first blush is that one may ratify an unauthorized
contract after he knows that it is to his own advantage to do so, and
so bind the other party to his apparent disadvantage. Further reflec-
tion, however, causes this apparent unfairness to disappear. The
other party, having agreed to be bound by this contract and not
having with-drawn from it, had no ground to complain if compelled
to perform; the original lack of authority having been cured."
Judge Noyes concurred. But Judge Lacombe dissented:'. "I cannot
reach the conclusion that there is no unfairness in the application
of the doctrine of ratification to the case at bar ... It certainly is
a harsh rule that would allow Kline Bros. and'Co. to hold this policy,
it may be for weeks, without ratification, able to defend against a
suit for the premiun 4 on the ground that it never made a contract,
but with the privilege of consummating the contract by ratification
as soon as a fire might break out."
Nevertheless the majority concluded: "... as the case was decided
so far as this question (that is, when the Kline Bros. and Co. had
in fact ratified) is concerned, on the ground that they could not
ratify after the fire, we think there must be a new trial, at which
the plaintiff will have an opportunity of showing, if he can, that they
did ratify the contract before the defendant withdrew from it."'"
Ratification of unauthorized contracts of insurance after occurrence of loss; and in
(1912) 12 COL. L. REv. 454, 458-Relation of principal and third party on ratifi-
cation of unauthorized contracts. The Harvard note is inclined to disagree with
Judge Hand's result; the Columbia note to agree. Neither mentions Grover v.
Matthews, but the note writers both consider that the ratification would have
been possible in England, and the Columbia discussion relies on Williams v. Ins.
Co., L. R. i C. P. Div. 757 (1876) of which more infra note 21.
1I 9 8 Fed. at 477. 13198 Fed. at 479.14See, however, National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ehrlich, infra note 71.
1
'The court repudiated the "English cases (which) go so far as to hold that one
may ratify even after the other has withdrawn from the contract." Boulton
Partners v. Lambert, 41 Ch. Div. 295 (1888); In re Tredeman, (1889) 2 Q. B. D.
66; In re Portuguese Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd., (89o) 62 L. T. R. 88.
Relying on these cases the notes cited supra note II, felt that the English courts
would hold contrary to Judge Hand's Kline Bros. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. decision.
As will be shown later the English courts found a way to agree with Judge Hand
(see page 165). It may well be that in a country where the insurance company
could not withdraw of his own motion it was necessary to give some cut-off by
operation of law. The Marqusee case doctrine permits the insurer to withdraw
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This left the issue: Had the insurer withdrawn before the self-ap-
pointed agent's principal affirmed? If the answer were "No" the
property owner would collect insurance. By this Marqusee doctrine,
therefore, the fire does not cut off ratification.16
On the other hand, "The latest English case cited fully sus-
tained the view of the court below,"' 17 said Judge Ward in the Marqu-
see case.'8 He was speaking of Grover and Grover Limited v. Matthews 9
tried in the Commercial Court by a single judge. The Grovers had
authorized Brows in 19o8 to place the insurance. By 19o9 his agency
had ceased, and the court held that he was not authorized in 19o9
to direct the same broker to renew it for that year. Knowing that
the i9o8 policy was to expire on March 25 th, I909, Brows, however,
wrote to the broker on March 4th about renewal and the broker on
March 5 th prepared a slip and at Lloyds got signatures on it including
that of Matthews. The fire occurred on -March 27th and the Grovers
on the same day tendered the premium. Matthews declined to take
it. Said Hamilton, J.,20 "The ratification ... was after the loss,
and with knowledge of the loss.., and it appears to me that the
judgments in Williams v. North China Insurance Company...
compel'me to say that it is too late for ratification; because as it
appears to me, the court of appeal... recognized that a rule which
would permit a principal to ratify an insurance even after loss was
known to him was an anomalous rule which it was not, for business
reasons desirable to extend, and which according to authorities,
had existed only in connection with marine insurance. No case has
at any time before ratification, and the second Marqusee case went in the in-
surer's favor, as set forth on page 170 infra, because it was decided there that he had
withdrawn after the fire and before ratification.
"Nor does even the property owners knowledge do so. But the question of
knowledge is considered later, page 183.
"It was not mentioned in the Kline case, supra note i i, and there is no report of
the I98 Fed. Marqusee case before Judge Hand.
18198 Fed. at 477.
19(1910) 2K. B. 4oi. It is not noted in the law reviews.
20(1910) 2 K. B. 401, 404.
2
'L. R. i.C. P. Div. 757 (1876). It was a suit on a marine insurance but not on a
"lost or not lost" policy. The policy was simply antedated to cover a ship which
was existing at the time the policy attached. After the loss and with knowledge
of the loss the principal party ratified. This, Cockburn, C. J. said, at page 764, the
existing authorities permitted. Jessel, M. R;, at page 766, simply stood on
the authorities. Mellish, L. J., did not refer to the topic at all, but Pollock, B., at
page 770, added "As a question of mercantile convenience, I think it very desir-
able that a ratification of an insurance under such circumstances should be per-
missible."
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been cited to me which suggests that this anomalous rule ought
to be extended to fire insurance."
This Graover case Judge Ward abruptly dismissed in his Marqusee
opinion, saying: "We cannot approve this conclusion."2 These two
are the cases which the examiner of the problem of post-fire ratifica-
tion meets on the most casual approach to it. The latest of the texts
on insurance to discuss the topic oppose them to each other.24
The Marqusee case was passed on by four judges-including the
trial judge-who, if they divided equally, seem to have given the
problem more thought than did Hamilton, J.2 who sat alone. More-
over, the same Circuit Court of Appeals adhered to its views in later
suits by the Kline Co. and Marqusee against other insurers,2 6 -
suits in which Judge Lacombe did not dissent; and other Federal
courts quote the case as established law. It represents, therefore, a
settled line of decision in the Federal courts.
This first Marqusee case, was noted in 42 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1025,
where are collected the state court authorities. They show that
ratification may be either a trap or a blessing for the property owner.
If he has a policy which will be voided by "other insurance" and
he is declared to have "ratified" the taking of additional coverage,
he is a strong opponent of his own ratification. He is an earnest
contender for it in the cases where the "ratified" policy is his hope of
financial salvation. Consequently, the decisions reveal him both
22There is nothing in the opinions which makes imperative Hamilton, J.'s
reading that the Williams case confines itself to marine insurance.
23198 Fed. at 478.
U4VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 92, 135, states the general doctrine of the
marine cases, citing holdings by the United States Supreme Court and the New
York Court of Appeals, and then discusses the two cases of the present text. He
contents himself with saying that the American decision "expressly disapproves"
the English "p. 92, 138". The more positive views favoring post-fire ratification
of COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929), and COOLEY, BRIEFS ON
INSURANCE (1927) are set forth in note 52 infra. RIcnARDs INSURANCE (4th ed.
1932) does not mention either case and his only discussion of the topic of post-
loss ratification concerns that of insurance "in trust" or "on account of" clause.
See pp. 421, 342, 759-60.
25Whether the Federal Supreme Court can be said to have passed even nega-
tively upon the Marqusee cases is not so clear. The Supreme Court refused
certiorari in 229 U. S. 621, 33 Sup. Ct. 1044 (1912) but thecitators put it as from
both 198 Fed. 475 and 198 Fed. 1023 (See ante Note 8). The Supreme Court
insists however that denial of certiorari "imports no expression of opinion upon
the merits of the case." United States v. Carver, 26o U. S. 482, 490, 43 Sup. Ct.
i81, 182 (1923); Atl. Coast LineR. R. Co. v. Powe, 283 U. S. 4o1, 51 Sup. Ct. 498
(1931).
26Marquseev. InsuranceCo. of NorthAmerica, 211 Fed. 9o3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914)-
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denying post-fire ratification and asserting post-fire ratification.
They show him, also caught in entanglements of insurance methods
from which the courts should be astute to rescue him whether at the
expense of logic or of consistency. In some of them the property
owner simply asks a representative of several insurers for coverage
and is told he is insured in Company A which later directs the common
agent to cancel its policy, whereupon the agent issues a policy in
Company B; and the property owner learns of the switching of policies
only after the fire has occurred. Some courts read these facts in
terms of antecedent authority, and hold Company B regardless of
the property owners post-fire act. But many of the opinions
even in such cases rely on ratiflcation, either solely, or in combina-
tion with the theory that antecedent authority was given to place
the coverage with any company including B. The common factor
among them all is their willingness to arrive at the practical result
of the Marqusee case, in holding that the property owner is pro-
tected by some insurance; and in many of the decisions the only
question is under which of the two policies the insured can be held
to be covered.
Such a case is Aetna Insurance Co. v. Renno27 where the Mississippi
Home Insurance Company, through the Lake-Lott agency, issued
and actually delivered to Renno its policy which it later instructed the
Lake-Lott agency to cancel. Without notifying Renno, the Agency
"cancelled" it on its books and applied to the Aetna Company for a
substitute policy, which the Aetna Company "issued" to the Agency.
Renno remained in ignorance of these doings until after the fire oc-
curred. When told that his first policy was "cancelled", and the
second one issued, he was assured by the Lake-Lott people that
the second fully protected him. Yet both companies denied liability.
Renno sued both. The gist of the decision is: "Of course the Home
Insurance policy was a valid subsisting insurance at the time of the
fire, and that insurance company is liable." Of the Aetna Com-
pany the court simply remarked that after the fire it "was too late for
Renno to ratify the unauthorized act of Lake-Lott." As the court
handled the case Renno was no sufferer whatever the court thought
about ratification after loss. Had the court read the facts as some
courts have, the Lake-Lott Agency had Renno's antecedent authority
both to accept the cancellation and to take out the new policy. As
the decision actually went it protected Renno under the first rather
than the second policy. On like facts these other courts would
protect him under the second policy rather than the first.
2793 Miss. 594, 46 So. 947 (19o8).
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The Mississippi Court asserted that Johnson v. North British
Insurance Company8 was "directly in point." In that case Johnson
also had asked Chappel, who was also agent for two companies, for in-
surance in either. Chappel delivered to Johnson a Hartford policy
which that company later told Chappel to cancel. Chappel then
wrote out the North British policy,-th-e one sued on. Of this switch-
ing of policies Johnson like Renno knew nothing until after the fire.
Holding that the Hartford policy was "other insurance" which
voided the North British policy by the latter's terms, the court
asked: "Did the election of Johnson to sue on the North British
policy (the second) * * * ratify the act of Chappel in entering a can-
cellation of the Hartford policy on his policy ledger... ?" It an-
swered that there was no ratification of the cancellation because
"Chappel did not purport to act for Johnson nor assume to have
authority to do so."29 This left Johnson protected, presumably,
under the first policy-after defeating him on the second.
The court's discussion of ratification in this case, therefore, concerns
not Chappel's taking out the second policy-the North British-but
his "cancelling" of the first policy. The "other insurance" clause
of the North British policy, however, was immaterial unless the
North British policy was otherwise in force; and it could be in force
only by ratification after loss. For Chappel on july 28th entered the
"cancellation" of the Hartford policy in his book and on the same day
wrote out the North British policy. The fire occurred on August 4 th
and Chappel did not succeed in seeing Johlson about either policy
until the ioth when the North British-the second policy-was de-
livered to Johnson. His election to sue on it apparently put the
policy into effect, and by post-fire ratification, so far that its "other
insurance" clause could be invoked by the insurer issuing it. Thus
the Ohio case is authority for post-fire ratification rather than against
it. 3 0
The Mississippi court cites no other authority, but it had, itself,
some six years previously, in Watson v. Southern Insurance Com-
2866 Ohio St. 6, 63 N. E. 61o (19o9).
29Supra note 28, at 17, 63 N. E. at 611.
30We are not, necessarily, concerned with Johnson's ultimate fortunes but 5
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA oIr INSURNCE LAW, at § io49, discusses the topic of other
insurance of which the owner does not know. Some courts give him the'benefit
of the original policy, in Johnson's case that of the Hartford Company on the
theory that the loss fixes his right in it and that ratification of the second does not
defeat his right. Others hold that if he ratifies the second he does lose the pro-
tection of the first policy. See VANCE INSURANCE 2d. ed. 1930 p. 729 for a dis-
cussion of the "hopeless variance."
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pany,3 ' permitted ratification after loss. Mrs. Watson was the
owner of a farm which a Mrs. Stewart rented from her. 2 Mrs.
Stewart's manager, on Nov. 12, igoo, secured a policy on the crops
for Mrs. Stewart and also on the buildings for Mrs. Watson. Mrs.
Watson did not know "that the policy had been issued in her favor
until after the fire occurred." But she made proof of loss and sued
on the policy. The court simply said "She ratified by suing. The ap-
pellee dealt with her after the fire on the theory that she had the
right to the insurance." It cited no cases.
In Todd v. German American Insurance Co.," after the fire, Todd
discovered that two of the three policies were in a company which
had become insolvent. Turpin, the agent to whom Todd had applied
for insurance in the first place, then told Todd that he had rewritten
these two policies in the German American Insurance Company on
its consent; and that he had the German American policies in his
vault. Todd did not then ask for the policies and the German Ameri-
can Company later told Turpin not to deliver them, although before
the fire Turpin's clerk had been sent with them to Todd's store for
delivery but had brought them back as Todd was away. Todd sued
on these German American policies and won.
Of the court's reasons the first is sufficient to cover any case where
the property owner a1iplies for insurance to a representative of several
companies: "It is to draw no strained inference to say that Todd's
expression to Turpin of his desire that his agency should carry. $6,ooo,
of his insurance was authority in the event that any portion of the in-
surance originally written should become cancelled... to replace it
with a policy in some other company represented in that agency."
This view, by itself, has satisfied some courts. But the Georgia
opinion put the case on broader grounds. For it added that "if
Turpin, assuming to act for Todd, but without any real authority
to bind him procured (the policy), and paid the premium, or by an
arrangement with the company substituted his promise to pay for
the actual payment, Todd could, after the fire, upon discovery of the
fact that Turpin had assumed to act for him, ratify the contract and
hold the company upon it."14 This Todd decision is much relied on
for the permissibility of post-fire ratification and is frequently cited.
The opinion, however, made much of the necessity that consider-
ation be paid or promised by Turpin, the "agent" party, of which
3131 So. 904 (Miss 1902).
32See Southern Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 30 So. 755 (Miss. 190).
'32 Ga. App. 789,59 S. E. 94 (1907).
34Supra note 33, at 798, 59 S. E. at 98.
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point the Marqusee case made little. 5 And its facts discount it as an
authority for the situation where the property owner has no dealings
with a representative of plural insurers.
The 42 L. R. A. note also cites as permitting ratification after loss
Watson v. Southern Insurance Company (which had already been
stated) and Hughes v. Insurance Company of North America5 where
Hughes, like Johnson, disavowed a second policy in order to meet the
defense by the first insurer, whom he was suing here, that there was
other insurance. The property was a store in charge of one Hyams
who, although he had no authority, secured a second policy for
Hughes with the Phoenix Company. Of this Hughes did not learn
until after the fire, but he made claim under this second policy upon
the Phoenix Company, which obligingly paid him. Said the court:
"Here, then, was a ratification by Hughes of the act of Hyams."
Thus the court did in fact permit ratification after loss, and Hughes
lost against the original insurer because he had taken other in-
surance.37 The L. R. A. note states that Larsen v. Thuringia etc.
Insurance Company,'8 and Motley v. Manufacturers Insurance Co.' 9
also permit ratification after loss.
There was thus a considerable body of existing case law to support
the Marqusee view. It had since been further collected by the inde-
fatigable Mr. Couch in his Cyclopedia of Insurance Law and it is
clear that the Marqusee case was no new departure in the current of
American thought on the topic.
The Marqusee-Kline insurance was again in litigation in the same
court in 1914,41 in suits on policies issued under the same facts by
other insurers. The court said "so far as his (the "agent" party
McIntosh's) authority to make the contract is concerned this case is
3
-Judge Ward in 198 Fed. at 477 said: "The circumstance that the premium
had not been paid is immaterial, because the delivery of the policy before re-
ceiving it amounted to a giving of credit."
3640 Neb. 626, 59 N. W. 112 (1894). 37See note 3o ante.
382o8 Ill. 166, 70 N. E. 31 (1904). It arose on a question of prorating among
several insurers. The insured himself argued that he could not ratify after loss.
But the court without much discussion said "We see no reason" why he could
not. The insurer on the ratified policy made no objection.
'929 Me. 337, 5o Am. Dec. 591 (1849). A lessee from a mortgagor took out a
policy which he caused to be made payable to "E. Motley, mortgagee." The court
said that Motley's "bringing this action is a sufficient ratification of the acts of the
lessees in procuring the insurance for his benefit." The case is discounted by
the fact that the lessee had agreed with his lessor "to keep the premises fully
insured."
4 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW. See infra note 52.
41Marqusee v. Ins. Co. of North America, 211 Fed. 903 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
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not different in its material facts from that in Marqusee v. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co., 198 Fed. 475.4 As McIntosh had no authority...
we must inquire whether the unauthorized contract subsequently
became effective by ratification.""4 Placing on "the party who sets
up the contract" the burden of proving the ratification, the court
unanimously" affirmed a direction for the insurance company which
had been given on the ground that a tender of the premiums by
McIntosh, who was then still acting without authority, did not
amount to a ratification by Kline Bros. "But an officer who makes
an unauthorized contract has no more right to ratify it than he has to
make it."5 The insurers' withdrawal was found to have occurred
before the Kline Company ratified McIntosh's tender, so that the
question left for trial by the Hartford case was answered adversely
to the would-be ratification. Thus the court adhered to the theory
previously laid down and simply applied it to the new fact. The
second Marqusee case is therefore a direct affirmation of the principle
of the first.
In National City Bai~k v. Wagner,"4 Judge Mack for the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit states: "That no consider-
ation was paid for the ratification (there in question) ... is likewise
immaterial" 7 adding "It has been held that ratification after loss by
fire is sufficient to render an insurance company liable on a policy
issued without payment of the premium and on the request of an un-
authorized agent. Marqusee v. Insurance Co., 198 Fed. 475." 48
In Palmetto Fire Insurance Co. v. Beha one of the much noted
Chrysler automobile insurance cases5" our present interest is not with
the fate of the praiseworthily efficient Chrysler scheme for making
installment selling safer for Chrysler, but with the standing in 1926 of
the Marqusee doctrine in the same Circuit Court of Appeals which
had stated in 1gi1 and affirmed it in 1914. Said A. N. Hand, C. J.,
4Supra note 41, at 905. 4Ibid. at 906.44Judge Lacombe was still a member.
4Supra note 41, at 906.
16216 Fed. 473 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914).
47Ibid, at 479. 48Ibid, at 479.
49I3 F. (2d) 500 (S. D. N. Y., 1925).
50The Chrysler Corporation evolved a scheme whereby the Palmetto Insurance
Company "immediately and automatically" insured every car sold "for account
of whom it may concern", effective however only when a car is sold to a retail
purchaser. A master policy was issued to the Chrysler Company and a "cer-
tificate" was issued to each retail buyer by the dealer from whom he purchased.
It fell foul of legislation in various states. See Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Conn.,
272 U. S. 295, 47 Sup. Ct. 88 (1926). See (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 989; (1927) 36
ibid. 419; (1927) 25 MIcH. L. RFnv. 777.
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in 1926: "Insurance may be taken out for whom it may concern.
This has been common enough in marine risks... The doctrine has
been extended to inland fire risks. (Marqusee v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 198 F. 475) though the English courts do not seem to have gone
that far. (Grover v. Matthews, (1910) 2 K. B. 401)". Although this
passage indicates a fusion of ideas which Judge Learned Hand care-
fully had "differentiated" in the Kline case,5 it shows that the
Marqusee case has survived a complete change of personnel in
the court which decided it. Thus the doctrine of the Marqusee de-
cision has remained unshaken in subsequent re-examination of the
topic in the Federal Courts.
Those American writers on insurance law whose works are suffi-
ciently late to include a discussion of the topic in the light of the more
recent decisions, accept the Marqusee case. Mr. Couch,52 writing in
1929 considers post-fire ratification permissible, as does Mr. Cooley53
5'192 Fed. 378 (S. D. N. Y. 1911). But is there a differentiation? It seems
curious to say that one sort of volunteer agent by adding "for whom it may
concern" or like words may create a ratifiable situation which power is denied to
another sort of volunteer agent. If it be said that the language indicates to the in-
surer that the applicant may be or is a volunteer agent this explanation would
make ratification possible in any cases where the self-appointed agent was known
by the insurer to be such. See p. 182 infra. At § 232, COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF
INSURANCE LAW collects the cases which permit ratification after loss where the
policy is taken as interest may appear by carriers or warehousemen. In Ferguson
v. Parish Council (x916) S. C. 715, the Scottish court however applied the doctrine
of the Grover Case to bar recovery by an employee of a poor house who lived
on the premises which with their contents the employer had insured, apparently
making the same fusion that A. N. Hand did, and using to the plaintiff's detri-
ment.
22 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw, (1929) 1361, § 480, Ratification
of agent's acts. Mr. Couch says: "If a party insures for another as principal with-
out the latter's prior authority or consent, the intended principal may ... adopt
and ratify. . ., in which case the ratification is equivalent to a prior authority, and
this, according to the weight of authority even after loss' or payment of the loss to
the agent2 in which case the agent receiving the money holds it for the owner's
benefit and notwithstanding that the premium was not paid prior to loss4 al-
though the contrary also has been held as to the latter point."s The numbers refer
to Mr. Cou~h's footnotes collecting the cases.
5Mr. Cooley's seven volumes of BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (1927), have no table of
cases. But in Volume I, at page 846, under the heading "Policy procured with-
out knowledge of insured" he says that life policies taken out without the con-
sent of the insured are void as against public policy. He adds, however, "But
where one though not duly authorized, assumes to act as agent for another and in
his name procures a policy on property which is subsequently burned, the person
in whose name the policy has been issued may ratify the assumed agency and as-
sert liability against the insurer to the same extent as if authority had been
originally conferred."
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writing in 1927. Mr. Vance writing in 193o states that the Marqusee
case "expressly disapproves" the Grover decision, but does not go
further into the topic. Mr. Richards in 1932 has little or nothing
on the subject."'
Mr. Cooley cites no cases not already discussed. But Mr. Couch
cites twenty-five favoring ratification after loss. Some deal with in-
surance placed by a custodian of goods on "intrust" policies, as to
which post-fire ratification by the owners of the goods is accepted.1'
Others of his cases have already been discussed herein. But Mr.
Couch adds Ferrar v. Western Assurance Co., where the facts were
similar to those of the Todd case" and where the court took the same
double ground in the plaintiff's favor saying: "But if Coleman were
not the general agent for the assured * * his action * * was ratified. * *
The authorities seem to hold that a ratification, though made subse-
quent to loss, is valid." This language was repeated in Kleiber
Motor Truck Co. v. International Indemnity Co., a California case,5a
in 1929.
The only recent decision denying post-fire ratification is Alliance
Insurance Co. v. Continental Gin Co. which is a case with a judicial
history. The facts involved the familiar set up of the property
owners application to the common agent of two companies, the issu-
ing of a policy in the Providence Company, its later "cancellation"
on that company's orders and its "replacement" with that of Alliance
Company. The insured had no notice of these doings until after
For this he cites simply Todd v. Insurance Co., 2 Ga. App. 789, 59 S. E. 94
(1907), and Marqusee v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 198 Fed. 475, 198 Fed. io23
(1912).
wasee ante note 24.
"Durand v. Thuron, i Porter (Ala.) 238 (1834), where Durand who had de-
posited laces with Thuron for sale recovered from Thuron part pf the proceeds of
Thuron's policy on "goods in his store". Wakins v. Durand, 1 Porter (Ala.) 251
(1834) was a similar case where the court stressed the immateriality of the fact
that the "adoption" was after the loss. Snow v. Carr, 61 Ala. 363 (1878),32
Am. Rep. 3 was a similar case involving Mrs. Carr's piano left with Mr. Snow "for
sale or rent". Mrs. Carr's interest was held to be covered because Snow's policy
described the property as "his own or held in trust", and this notwithstanding
that Mrs. Carr herself testified that she had not asked Snow to insure and had no
knowledge of any insurance till "long after the fire." In Miltonberger v. Beacom,
9 Pa. St. 198 (1848) these earlier Alabama cases are relied on in a case where a
landlord re-entered premises and insured them. As in the Alabama cases the
dispute concerned the distribution of money paid to the landlord and did not
directly involve the insurance company.
" 3 o Cal. App. 489, x59 Pac. 6o9 (1916); rehearing denied 3o Cal. App. 494,
159 Pac. 611 (1916).
56Ante note 33. 5a289 Pac. 865 (Calif. App.).
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the fire, when the Providence Company blandly declared its policy
out of the picture while the Alliance Company assured him that it was
too late to ratify. He sued both. The trial court found for him
against the Alliance Company and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
in 1925 held 7 "On principle we know no reason why an effective
ratification cannot be * * after loss", citing the state court authorities
heretofore set out in this paper, but not mentioning any of the Kline-
Marqusee cases or Grover v. Matthews. In 1926 the Texas Com-
mission of Appeals reversed the decision. 8 In denying ratification it
relied solely on Kline Bros. v. Royal Insurance Co. 9 which the Mar-
qusee case had overruled, and Grover v. Matthews which the
Marqusee case had repudiated. It did not mention the Marqusee case
or any of the decisions heretofore stated in this paper. But in 1919
the Commission itself had held, apparently on the theory of ante-
cedent authority, that under like facts the property owner was
covered by the second policy without having to "ratify" at all,"9a
that is, without any post-fire acts on his part. Aside from this Texas
case the current of American decision in favor of post-fire ratifi-
cation is otherwise undeflected.59b
Recently New York has sharply diverged from the Texas final
result under similar facts and has done so without resorting to ratifi-
cation at all as Texas itself had previously done. In this New York
case, Rose Inn Corporation v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. and
Importers and Exporters Insurance Co.,60 the property owner simply
told the Van Voast Agency, representing twenty-five insurers, to
keep him insured for a stated sum. When insuring companies notified
the Van Voast Agency to cancel, the Agency wrote new policies in
other companies. At the time of the fire the "new policies had not
been exchanged" as the Appellate Division put it, but6 they had been
"mailed * * together with notices of cancellation of the old" to the
property owner but had not been received by him. The Court of
Appeals said 2 that under the circumstances "It is a principle of almost
57 Tex (1925); 274 S. W. 299.
58 Tex (1926); 285 S. W. 257. rehearing
denied- Tex. (1926) 287 S. W. 244.
9S8ee supra note II.
51'Dalton v. Norwich Fire Ins. Soc. Tex. (1919) 213, S. W. 230, reversing the
Court of Civil Appeals 175 S. W. 459 (1915) where post-loss ratification was much
discussed.
"9bSee Nat. F. Ins. Co. v. Oliver 204 S. W. 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 2918:) Clawer v.
Fid. Phenix F. I. Co. 296 S. W. 257 (5th Ct. App. Mo. 1927).
80258 N. Y. 51 (1932).
1228 App. Div. 351 (1932).
62258 N. Y. 54 (1932.
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universal acceptance that the (Van Voast Agency) has power to
waive for the assured the five day period of cancellation, to cancel the
policies at once and immediately to write new policies * * so that the
new policies become at once effective."
Under similar facts the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, said in May v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. 3 "When the in-
sured applies directly to an agent of several companies, and gets from
him a promise of general and continuous protection against fire, it is
indeed abundantly settled that the agent acts for both sides, and the
courts have been at some pains to show that the apparent opposition
of interest will not invalidate any substitutions he may make."
Many of the decisions cited under "ratification" are double agency
cases but handled by the court in terms of ratification. Without such
facts, however, in i931 in the Norwich Union case with which this
paper started, the court stated the issue to be: "whether or not James
and Co. insurance brokers by whom said insurance was placed were
authorized and, if not, whether the ratification of their act after the
fire was sufficient to obligate the appellant companies under the
binder procured by James and Co?" The trial court denied a motion
for judgment in favor of the defendants and the ruling was assigned
as error. Without citing the Marqusee case the Circuit Court of
Appeals followed its doctrine and adhered, as if instinctively, to the
American view, that even if no antecedent authority can be worked
out there may be post-fire ratification.
(b) The English Authorities
What of the Grover case in England? There is no mention of it in the
lists of English "cases judicially noticed". It stands alone so far as
appears. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Insurance, Section 1o99
reads: "The doctrine in marine insurance that the contract of in-
surance may be ratified after knowledge of the loss does not apply to
life insurance, nor indeed to any other contract of insurance." The
note to this section cites simply Grover v. Matthews; and the cross
reference to a note on the marine insurance cases again cites only the
Grover case.
(c) The Anwrican Law Institute's Restatement
Under the heading "At what time ratification may be effected," the
Restatement of Agency reads: "Section xz6, except as to contracts of
marine insurance, the act of affirmance must occur before such a
6297 Fed. 997 (1923). The court adopted an opinion by L. Hand, D. J.
USee supra note i.
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change in conditions that it is a reasonable inference that the third
person would not after such a change enter into a transaction similar
to the one in question. "1a
Although the judicial sources of the Restatement are not revealed
in any of the Institute's publicationslb it seems reasonably obvious
that the inspiration for its Section i16, is this'English case, Grover v.
Matthews.60
The illustration under § :116 which makes the property owner's
knowledge of the fire the touchstone of his disqualification leads to
the same inference, for the court's language in the Grover case is
such that it may be that their knowledge of the loss rather than the
fact of the loss was what defeated the Grovers.
(d) Comment on the Authorities as Set Forth
Considering the American decisions and commentators on the one
side, we find them opposed, on the other side, by the English case
and the Restatement; and the two latter advancing views which the
outstanding American case expressly rejects. Aside from any other
considerations the American view makes no distinction between its
handling of post loss ratification in marine and in fire insurance.
It disposes of both harmoniously in favor of the ratification. The
opposite view accepts the variance in treatment by rejecting the possi-
bility of post loss ratification if the peril-is that of fire. But if rati-
fication is to be denied it would seem that the denial should be of
ratification per se; of ratification after loss on some principle of general
scope, rather than of ratification merely according to the peril in-
volved. Why there should be any difference on this ground the
writer.does not see and there is no enlightenment in the opinions.
Hamilton, 'J.s opinion in the Grover case set forth no justification.
He merely remarked that it did not seem "for business reasons
64a§ i6, inferentially, denies ratification in any case where the subject matter
of the transaction has changed in value since the third person's dealing with the
self-appointed agent. If the former had agreed with the "agent" to buy stocks
of the principal at pre-depression prices, the break in the market would appar-
ently make ratification impossible; if the third party had agreed to sell goods on a
rising market, the rise would put ratification out of the question.
"bThe commentary which accompanies the Restatement gives no citation of
cases. Nor was the section considered at any meeting of the Institute's member-
ship. The discussions appear to begin only with Part II, § 156, See 5 Proceedings
of the American Law Institute (1927) 284.
e1cThe purpose of the American Law Institute has been set forth by one who
has had a large part in it, to be "the preparation of restatements in concrete form
the existing common law of the United States". G. W. Wickersham in address as
President of the Institute at the Fifth Annual Meeting, May 12-14, 1927.
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desirable to extend" the marine rule to the fire case he was dealing
with. His "hunch" was the reverse of the court's "hunch" in the
Paramount Lasky case at the opening of the paper. But while it may
well be that many a legal doctrine is first floated in some mental
jump of a judge, the American "hunch" is fortified by the showing
that other judicial minds have jumped the same way. After this dis-
cussion of the authorities the writer now turns to the further task of
examining their common jump on principle.
II. POST-Loss RATIFICATION-ON PRINCIPLE
What can be said of post-loss ratification on principle? It invites
what might be called moralistic consideration. To Judge Lacombe it
appeared the property owner sought to reap where he has not sown.65
But in the insurance field the reaper who has not sown is not new.
All the courts accept it if the insurance peril is marine in character
even on the very point under discussion. In other fields of insurance
there are other examples of it. In behalf of the buyer of insured
property which bums after he signs the contract but before the deed
day, judicial ingenuity in this country joins with legislative largesse
in England to give him the benefit of insurance which he did not take
and which the seller did not take on his behalf.66 If a creditor insures
the life of a debtor and the debtor dies too promptly, the debtor's
estate reaps where it has not sown, getting benefits of insurance not
taken in its behalf.67 Where bailees or custodians insure the whole
bulk of the various articles entrusted to them the owners thankfully
reap, even under the permission of courts which deny ratification
after loss.6 8 Judge Lacombe's words are "unfairness" and "wicked"-
unfair to the insurer, wicked on the part of the ratifier. A cynic view
of the judicial and legislative treatment of the insurer in this country
indicates that short shrift has been accorded his defenses based on
such epithets. That the managers of insurance accumulations have
fallen under such opprobrium in defending the funds entrusted to
them is one of the curiosities of our national psychology. Other
custodians of the small contributions of the many do not meet it.
A plaintiff against a savings bank, for instance, has no such merit as a
plaintiff against an insurance company!
But the writer believes it unnecessary to resort to cynicism in
6ig8 Fed. at 477. 660n this point, see VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 193o) 66o.
67VANCE, ibid shows the various solutions of the puzzle. Instead of voiding the
policy and letting nobody recover one line of cases makes the insurer pay the face
of the policy, and gives the windfall in excess of the debt and costs to the debtor's
family. "8See supra note Si.
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dealing with post-loss ratification. The American decisions favoring
it are not simply more instances of openhandedness for an insurance
plaintiff with a hardluck story. Viewed in the light of the ordinary
practices of the insurers themselves the facts scarcely indict the rati-
fication-seeking property owner; not even when he knows of the fire.
In Grover v. Matthews, the English case denying ratification, the
Grovers offered to pay premiums, a few hours after the fire, on a
policy renewed at the instance of one no longer their employee.
Measured against the methods of doing business which the insurers
themselves adopt, the reprehensability of the Grovers is not obvious.
Insurers can scarcely expect to have only the benefits and not the
other consequences of their own methods; and on this side of the
water, at least, the insurer, as a matter of course, renews an expiring
policy and forwards the new policy with a bill for the premium. In
so doing he might himself be called for self-appointed "agent" of
the property owner, who may "ratify" by paying the bill. The latter
may hold open the matter as long as the insurance people do not
notify him to the contrary.69 That a fire may occur in the meantime
is a risk covered at the rates they bill for.70 A New York case"
69The RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS reads, § 35 that "An offer maybe termi-
nated by (c) death or destruction of a person or thing essential for the perform-
ance of the proposed contract." Section 49 reads: "Where a proposed contract
requires for its performance the existence of a specific person or thing, and before
acceptance the person or thing is destroyed, the offer is terminated unless the
offeror assumes the risk of such mischance". The "Explanatory Notes" issued
by the Reporter do not discuss sections 35 or 49. Nor is the topic adverted to in
WILLISTON CONTRACTS (1920) c. IV on Duration and terminatioan of offers except
as to death of persons. In the same work at Volume 3. § 1559 et seq. 2763,
the author deals with Errors in regard to an object to which the contract relates and
Nonexistence of goods sold. In the latter discussion he says that the result,-that
the sale is void,-is put sometimes "upon the ground of impossibility, sometimes
upon the ground of mistake, and sometimes on the lack of mutual assent owing to
mistake" and that the cases are few.
In the CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY, Vol. XIV Supplement annotation to 35,
49 Mr. Whiteside remarks, p. 43, that "there is no direct authority in New York
supporting these propositions", and no insurance cases are cited. See however
note 74 infra. The ratification may be fitted in under the last. phrase of § 49,
however, without doing violence to the argument set forth in the text of the
present paper at p. i8o.
701n Williams v. No. China Ins. Co., supra note 21, Cockburn, C. J., after the
statement supra note 21, added, at page 764: "Where an agent effects insurance
subject to ratification the loss insured against is very likely to happen before rati-
fication, and it must be taken that the insurance so effected involves that possi-
bility asthebasis ofthe contract." He was speaking of a merely antedated policy.
nIn National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ehrlich, 122 Misc. 682, 2o3 N. Y. Supp.
434 (Sup. Ct., App. Term 1924) a broker who had for sometime procured fire in-
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has held the property owner liable for premiums for the 6o day
period during which he delayed his repudiation of the insurance com-
pany's act. The court said: "If a fire had occurred under these
circumstances plaintiff would not have been heard to say that the de-
fendant had not accepted the insurance, and defendant should pay
the premium for the time he unreasonably retained the policy."Th
If the wickedness of post-fire ratification is that the property
owner holds matters in suspension until after the fire, these renewal
practices of the insurers invite just that "wickedness". Volenti non
fit injuria. In the ordinary renewal cases the insurer is self starting.
The Grovers tendered premiums on a renewal which the insurer had
offered them at the instigation of the Grover's self-appointed "agent".
It could just as well have been inspired by the insurer's own routine
overhauling of his card index. The Grovers were, morally speaking,
merely in the position of one who seeks by paying the bill after the
loss to accept insurance extended by his renewing insurer on credit.
Are the property owners in the Marqusee case more wicked or un-
fair? If they were placing insurance de novo at the time when they
seek to ratify, it is true that a host of insurance authorities rise up
against them. If they knew of the fire and did not tell, their duty to
disclose known and material facts upsets them.73 If they did not
surance policies for Ehrlich, on an expiry day sent a renewal policy in the plain-
tiff's company and a bill for the premium. Ehrlich retained the policy for two
months and then replied to a dun for the premium by returning the policy, where-
upon the insurance company brought suit for two months' premium, and got
judgment.
72Supra note 7, at 683. There is no other report of the case. But it was noted
in (I925) i0 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 250. This note states that by the ma-
jority holdings in this country the company is liable for losses occurring during
the period of suspension, and this even if the policy expressly recites that it does
not attach until the premium is paid. This, it says, "is a necessary result from the
nature of the business; all the convenience is in favor of the insured, who could
and naturally would take advantage of (the situation) if a loss ever occurred."
Westchester F. I. Co. v. Gurian, 115 App. Div. 61o, io N. Y. Supp. 5o (2nd
Dept. 19o6) was authority for the holding of the Ehrlich case.' See also Fire
Assn. v. Bonds, i7i Ark. io66, 287 S. W. 587 (1926). A note in (1913) 21 YALE
L. J. 626 collects authorities on the waiver of the prepayment clause.
"The concealment, or, more accurately, non-disclosure doctrine still functions.
A neat illustration from recent litigation is Sebring v. Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins.
Co., 255 N. Y. 382, 174 N. E. 761 (i93i), where the insurer offered to prove that
the plaintiff "as attorney had represented Hubbard (his tenant on the premises
at the fire) in various actions against insurance companies.. .that Hubbard had
been convicted in Pennsylvania of conspiracy to defraud insurance companies
and that plaintiff had defended him", and defended that plaintiff had not dis-
closed these facts. The New York Court of Appeals held that it was error to
bar the evidence. See also Stipcich v. Metropolitan L. I. Co. 277 U. S. 311, 48
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know of the fire they are defeated by the familiar presumption that
the coverage is only of those risks which may arise after the contract7 4
takes effect. This last is however, only a presumption of intention.
It is possible that the intention can be otherwise. It is otherwise in
the "lost or not lost" policy; and it is otherwise in these ratification
cases, as an analysis of the statistical elements in the insurer's arrange-
ment with the self appointed "agent" of the property owner shows.
In the Marqusee cases the coverage purported to be from the time
when the "agent" and insurer acted on March 16th. At that time the
property existed. As of that time, on a known risk, and at a then
accurately calculable rate, the insurer issued and delivered his policy,
looking to the future for his premium. When later offered that
premium, he was, actuarily speaking, and notwithstanding the fire,
just where he would have been had he dealt directly with the property
owner at the issuance of the policy, and on credit. On the morning
of the nineteenth of March-the day of the fire--he would have
taken the premium; and if he had he would have been where he had
figured himself to be even though the fire occurred that afternoon.
The coverage was from March 16th and the premium was calculated
from that day. Fire after March sixteenth therefore is the accepted
risk within the intention of the insurer. This is clear enough if the
insurer deals directly with the property owner. Whether the insurer
deals directly with the property owner or with his self-appointed
"agent" does not however make the risk any less definable in terms of
time or of the insurers intentions. Whether the premium is tendered
before or after the fire cannot change the arithmetical basis, in terms
of time and identified property, of the insurer's calculations of the
risk he has in mind. 75 His transaction with the agent party may be
treated as an offer to the property owner, made by the insurer through
the "agent", to sell a coverage which is intended to date from the offer
day, for a stated sum to be paid if the property owner chooses to close
with it, and paid by him at any time before the offer is revoked,
precisely as in the renewal cases. Judge Ward substantially so
treated it and he decided the Marqusee case accordingly. His view
Sup. Ct. 512 (1928), per Stone, 3., and note (1928) i4 CORNELL LAW QUAR-
TERLY 91.
74The property to be covered is presumed to be in existence, not as a matter of
law, but rather of the intention of the parties. See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1920) 2765. A recent case dealing with the topic is Rose Co. v. Globe and R. Co.,
262 Mass. 469, i6o N. E. 3o6 (1928). The court reads it as a matter of intention
that property already on fire was not to be covered. See 2 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON
INSURANCE (1927) 5367, 5372. A "lost or not lost" policy indicates an intention
contrary to that ordinarily implied. 75See supra note 70.
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of the matter negatived wickedness on the property owner's part as
effectively as it negatived unfairness to the insurer.
Beside these renewal practices, there are additional analogies in
the customs of the insurance men themselves which bear on the ratifi-
cation topic. In antedated policies insurer and property owner agree,
today, that the'former cover property from a day last week. Under
"lost or not lost" policies they may agree to do it even as to property
which may not in fact be in existence on the day selected for the policy
to attach. But the "lost or not lost" policies are not the analogues for
the ratification problem, and confusion follows the attempt to confine
ratification to "lost or not lost" marine cases. TheWilliainscase 8 was
not one, it will be remembered. The analogy for the post-fire rati-
fication case is that of the antedated policy written on property
which exists in fact and in contemplation on the antecedent date at
which the policy recites it will attach. The premium figure in each
case assumes the property to be in existence at the date stated for
the insurance to attach. It is no such amount, in either case, as it
is in a "lost or not lost" insurance. Such antedated policy transactions
the insurers not only arrange, but they arrange them on credit, and
the decisions permit the insured to pay the premium after loss and
with knowledge of the loss.
El Dia Insurance Company v. Sinclair 7 is an example. Under a
policy, signed on May ioth purporting by its terms to cover property
from April 28th, it was there held that the owner could collect for
a fire which occurred on April 29th. The insurance company fought
on many grounds, but it made no point of these time sequences, not-
withstanding that it issued the policy on credit, and the premium was
not paid until July seventh when the property owner was certain-as
the case was decided-of collecting up to the face in return for the
amount he then paid. As a New Jersey judge78 put it, "The question,
therefore, really is: is a contract to insure against fire from a time
past-void in law? **It is every day's practice both in marine and fire
insurance.** Many cases will be found recognizing the validity of
such contracts."
So far therefore as principle be read in terms of the would-be-
76Supra note 21.
7228 Fed. 833 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) noted in (1916) 16 COL. L. REV. 257, (1916)
29 HARV. L. REV. 554. Neither note, however, is on the point discussed in the
present text.
78Vredenburgh, J., in Hallock v. Commercial Ins. Co., 26 N. J. L. 268, 275
(1857). Since 1857 the authorities have been uniformly in accord: see them
collected in a note to the Marqusee case (i98 Fed. 475) in (1913) 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1025 and COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (2nd ed. 1927) 149.
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ratifier's "wickedness", it seems that the judicial holdings upon the
insurance analogies; and the practices prevailing among the insurance
people themselves, make for the Marqusee case rather than the
Grover case.
Unfairness to the insurer has already been considered in the
actuarial argument, but if it be urged that the Marqusee doctrine
subjects the insurer to an adverse selection in that the fire-suffering
property owner will surely ratify, while the others may or may not do
so, one answer is that the insurance companies are willing apparently
to venture this possibility. If they actually know that the property
owner's "agent" party is self-appointed this is clear. If they them-
selves choose to use a representative who also represents other com-
panies and to whom owners simply apply for insurance not specifying
any company to carry it, they act -with knowledge of the methods
used by Chappel and Todd and Coleman and the Van Voast Agency
in the cases heretofore stated. Another make-weight~concerns their
recession from the arrangement with the "agent". If the American
doctrine leaves the insurers subject to ratification after loss it also
grants them, as English views do not, the protection of withdrawal
before ratificationsa. This saved the insurers in the final outcome of
the Marquseecases.
The race between ratification on the property owner's side and
cancellation on the insurer's, is reminiscent of the similar race be-
tween the offeree's acceptance of an offer and the offeror's notification
to the offeree of its withdrawal. So far as appears in the cases there
would be nothing to object to if in issuing a binder to a known self-
appointed "agent"-as in the Paramount Lasky case-the insurer
incorporated a clause that the occurrence of the loss should be deemed
to be a withdrawal of the "offer". If so, the property owner could
scarcely be deemed able to select how much of the agent party's act
he would adopt; all or nothing should be the rule for him. So long as
the insurers do not insert such provisions they must be considered
willing to chance whatever adverse selection the Marqusee doctrine
may contain.
If "public policy" be appealed to, rather than "wickedness" and
"unfairness", the Marqusee doctrine, while leaving the insurer,
statistically, where it meant to be when it figured its premium,
operates to spread losses. The general social argument for insurance
as an institution speaks for the American result; and if we make the
price of ratification the actual cash payment of the premium we
conclude the injustice-to-the-insurer argument. He then has had all
781 See ante note i5.
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that his own arrangement entitles him to. The public policy theme
indeed makes for allowing post-fire ratification rather than against it.
Denying the possibility of ratification makes it possible for insurers to -
raise the technical point of the agent's authority in practically any
instance where the property owner has not been himself directly dealt
with. The English doctrine, particularly, invites the insurer to
agitate the question of the agent's authority if a fire happens to occur
during a credit period. Under it attack on an agent's authority may
be made, indeed, even though the agent pays the premiums on the
spot. As a final make-weight against the English view, on the public
policy side it makes ineffective a neighbor's act of informal goodwill.
Inferentially it makes impossible the very useful practice of un-
solicited renewals in behalf of forgetful customers, to which the in-
surance men themselves have habituated the American people. The
writer concludes that on the whole there is no argument on principle
sufficient to warrant the abandonment of the American rule.
III. THE PROPERTY OWNERS KNOWLEDGE OF THE OCCURRENCE
OF THE Loss
What of the compromise rule that it is not the occurrence of the fire,
but the property owner's knowledge of the fire which cuts off rati-
fication? If the refusal to permit ratification is based on fairness to
the insurer it is just as unfair to let the ignorant principal ratify as it is
to permit the knowledgeable one to do so. The impact on the in-
surer's pocket nerve is identical in either case. This is as clear,
as it is clear that the property owner when he learns of the fire, will,
joyfully and with fervor, cry, "Thank God A has arranged insurance."
Nothing will end with a sharper jerk his willingness "to let things
ride". If A has not paid up P will hasten to do so. The human
nature factor in the problem makes so infallibly for the attempt at
ratification that no discussion of the general topic can omit this partic-
ular topic of P's knowledge.
Admittedly if the self-appointed agent has actually paid the pre-
mium the argument is more plausible that he had purchased for the
property owner an option, on coverage from the option day, with
which the owner may close after the fire. If he is conceived to be
closing with an option purchased for him and paid for, it is not so
hard to concede that he may ratify despite his knowledge. If, how-
ever, the agent has paid nothing the situation is more difficult.
Concededly there is less shock to our sense of fair play if the ratifica-
tion seeker when tendering the premium is ignorant of the occur-
rence of the fire than when he knows of it. Nevertheless and not-
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withstanding his knowledge the writer's previous argument that
there is nothing actuarily inequitable in the credit situation com-
mits him to permitting the property owner to take up the credit
even after the fire. At most, the ratifier-should actually produce
and pay or tender cash in order to close with the insurer. This
he did in the Grover case. And in the second Marquesee case the
court not only required the tender but required it to be substantially
from him. Concerning the credit point a remark of the court in the
El Dia case is apt. There, at the time the owner paid up he knew that
the fire had occurred.7 9 Yet Judge Rogers said80 * * "the policy took
effect by relation from the day of its date. By antedating the policy
the defendant assumed the retrospective risk * * in the same manner
as if it had been issued on the day it bore date." To him the case,
though a credit transaction, presented nothing inequitable. Thus in
the antedated insurance on learning of a fire, the property owner may
pay up and close a credit. He may also pay up' after knowledge in the
renewal cases already discussed. The Marquesee doctrine permits
him to do the same thing and under the same circumstances in a
ratification case. The Norwich Uniona case made ratification out of
post-loss tender after knowledge."' The property owner's knowledge
of the fire therefore fades out of the picture if the Marqusee doctrine is
accepted. Under it the property owner may ratify despite the fire and
notwithstanding his knowledge of the fire, unless and until the in-
surer has withdrawn from the arrangement he made with the "agent."
In Judge Ward's view &a the insurer is left where he put himself
even as against this prospect of sure ratification. Anything less than
this holding would greatly discount the value to the property owner
of the American views permitting post-fire ratification. If the
owner who knows is disqualified ratification would be seldom possible
in fact and in practice, since, as things go, the owner is the one who
knows soonest.
The American Law Institute Agency Restatement although it is
hostile to post-fire ratification injects a saving "illustration" to §i6
Olt was nearly ten weeks after loss before the owner paid. The insurer ac-
cepted the money though it, too, knew of the fire. The litigation was on other
points. If it bethought that the acceptance of the money was a waiver-of which
nothing is said-it at least shows that the insurance people felt no injustice to
themselves in the offer.
80228 Fed. at 481. scaSupra note i.
BiThis is not altogether clear on the facts. But a note in (1932)32 COL. L. REV.
139 concludes: "The instant case... appears to permit ratification even though
the premium has not been paid. This extension of the American doctrine is
supported by the decided cases." 81aSee ante p. 164.
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of its text :"The house burns to P's knowledge; there is no insurance".1b
Inferentially the property owner who is ignorant may ratify: the one
who knows may not. Possibly this is the precise meaning of the
Grover-Matthews case-as has already been remarked. Conceding
that knowledge of the loss does not disqualify the ratification in the
marine cases Hamilton, J., may have intended to separate the fire
cases off from them merely to the extent of denying ratification, only
after knowledge, in the fire cases. What is meant by "P's knowledge"?
The Restatement obviously intends that what he actually knows
shall bar him. By imputation, however, he may have "knowledge"
when he does not "know" at all in any personal sense.82 If the
ignorant owner may ratify and the knowledgeable one may not, is the
disqualifying "knowledge" to be that of the personal variety, merely,
or will it be what his agents know? The injection of the knowledge
factor makes necessary an examination of this question.
Nothing in the Restatements Section i6, or in its illustration,
furnishes an answer. But under a general heading time when knowl-
edge is effective, Section 503, reads: "The P is affected by the knowledge
which the agent has when acting for him, or if it is the duty of the A to
communicate the information and not to act, the P is affected after
the lapse of such time as is reasonable for its communication."I, The
accompanying "illustration" reads "A, agent for P, who has the duty
of reporting to P the condition of P's ships learns that one of them
has sunk. He telegraphs this information to P, but the telegram is
delayed and before receiving it P insures the vessel "lost or not lost".
P is not affected by A's knowledge."' 4 This is from the marine in-
surance law to which the Restatements anti-ratification section, 1 16,
by its terms and its illustration does not apply. Section 5o3 which is a
rough summary of several marine insurance decisions,n seems in-
81b See supra note p. 5.
"'See RESTATEMNT OF AGENCY (Am. L. Inst. 1930) 491 et seg.
nNo cases are cited; nor was Section 503 taken up in the meeting of the In-
stitute which discussed the part of the Restatement in which it is included. See 8
PROCEEDINGS OF ABiERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1930).
8If this means that the "ship is thereafter lost" the problem is not the same as it
is if it means the "ship is lost at the time A acts." If A secures for P a "lost or
not lost" promise at the rate appropriate to such a policy, he pays or lets P in for
payment of a premium vastly larger than in the case of a policy not so worded.
The ordinary policy at the usual rate cannot attach unless the ship is in existence
at the time of the A-P dealing. If it is then in existence, Section I I6 itself permits
the ratification. What the Restatement would do with an unauthorized "lost or
not lost" policy which the shipowner sought to ratify to known loss is not stated.
8
sAlthough they do not (not expressly, at any rate), put upon the insurer the'
hazards of defects in communication agencies which are operated by third parties
-as the Restatement does. See ilote 98 infra.
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tended in its first part to cover the situation when the agent, pre-
sumably an authorized person, who secures insurance for a principal,
has knowledge which the principal has not: the second part ap-
parently concerns the agents who have custody of the property-in
the marine cases, either the ship's master or some local agent to
whom he reports the disaster.
If an agent to procure insurance does not personally know a dis-
qualifying something which the principal knows, we have the same
problem as in the case where the agent in charge of the property
knows something which his principal, who is placing insurance, does
not yet personally know. Shall we impute knowledge, and if so, as of
what time? If P's uninsured ship is wrecked, its master, Captain A,
of course knows this at once, and if P therefore knows it at once, P
can get no insurance. Even should the policy be written "lost or not
lost", if P knows that the ship is sunk he is disqualified for material
non-disclosure, indeed for actual fraud, in so far as he is applying for
insurance de novo.
There is some history on this. In General Interest Insurance Co.
v. Ruggles88 the "lost or not lost" policy, dated the 9th of February,
covered the ship from the twelfth of January. She had in fact been
lost on the igth. of January, but of this the owner, who himself
placed the insurance, knew nothing because "the master * * for the
purpose and with the design that the owner not hearing of the loss
of the vessel might effect insurance thereon, did * * not write to the
owner and took measures to prevent the fact of loss being known,"
and the owner's ignorance was due to the delay.
Story, J., at trial charged, in favor of the insured, that "If the
owner * * had not knowledge but acted in entire good faith," he was
not precluded from a recovery, 87 thus seeming to make the owner's
personal status the test. The Supreme Court affirmed, but the ship
master bothered it. "If", it said, "the owner is presumed to know
whatever is known to the master there could be no valid policy
effected upon a vessel when she was in point of fact lost."8 8 From
this tacit assumption that imputation is instantaneous the court re-
coiled. "But when the subject matter of the agency became ex-
tinct * * there might be a moral duty resting on the master to com-
municate information of the loss to his owner. But how could there
be any legal obligation binding upon him to do it?"89 Thus total
S,2 Wheat. 4o8 (U. S. 1827).
8TThis is from 12 Wheaton, at 40. Judge Story's opinion is in 4 Mason 74
(1825) but his language is as quoted.
8812 Wheaton, at 411. 89z2 Wheaton, at 413.
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loss ends the agency. In partial loss disasters, said the court, "The
policy * * related back * * and the master, although the agent of
the owner until the loss occurred became, upon the abandonment, the
agent of the underwriters." ' Picture the later meeting! The owner
asks, "Captain, whatever became of that ship of mine which you
took out last year?" Captain Hardluck, who has lost the ship en-
tirely, replies: "You have no right to any information from me about
her!" The partial loss argument fares no better. The master's duty
is before the court as part of the question of the validity of the policy.
Abandonment to underwriters arises only when and if the policy is
valid.
However ineptly, the Ruggles case was decided on the purely per-
sonal status of the owner. But to ignore imputation entirely is no
longer possible. The Ruggles case has not stood the test of time. A
property owner securing insurance is not free of the peril of having
imputed to him the disqualifying knowledge of his agents. In Proud-
foot v. Montefiore9' the lost or not lost policy, placed in England by the
cargo owner, covered cargo from Smyrna to Liverpool; and was dated
Jan. 3ist, 186r. But there had been a total loss by the 23rd of Janu-
ary, as Rees, the owner's factor in Smyrna, knew on the 24 th. On the
26th, the first mail out, he wrote the news adding "I hope to goodness
you are fully insured * * Lloyds' agents have telegraphed (the wreck).
I did not dare telegraph you, for once you had intelligence in hand
you were prevented from insuring."92  Although the telegraphed
information was published by Lloyds in England on January 29th,
the court expressly stated that "There was, no fraud or undue con-
cealment by the plaintiff of a material fact within his personal knowl-
edge."93 Yet the English ship owner failed where Mr: Ruggles suc-
ceeded. "Notwithstanding'the dissent of so eminent a jurist as Mr.
Justice Story, we are of opinion that the case of Fitzherbert v. Mather"
and Gladstone v. King9 were well decided; and that if an agent whose
duty it is * * to communicate * * as to the state of a ship and cargo
omits to discharge such duty * "9' the owner's insurance is of no
effect. This duty survived the disaster.
90I2 Wheaton, at 414.. 91L. R. 2 Q. B. 511 (1867).
"Supra note gi, at 518. 93Ibid.
six T. R. 12 (1785) where an agent was employed to ship cargo and to notify
another agent who was to effect the insurance. The failure of the first, who had
written that the vessel had sailed, to communicate the fact that she had later
grounded-which he might have done by the same post-was held to be fatal to
the insurance.
9I M. & S.35 (1813). Master failed to notify the owner of a stranding.
"Supra note 9I, at 521.
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By this English view the principal may "know" by imputation 97
and he "knows" apparently, as of the time when he would know if a
diligent agent had used the best available means of informing him
promptly.9 8 Had the policy been issued before the arrival in England
of the Lloyds telegram-taking its time as a measure for the time of
the telegram which Rees should have sent-the insurance would have
been valid. That these few days of grace are not dependent on how
or why the agent fails to inform the principal seems clear; and this
grace time does not depend upon the character of the agent's acts.
They were "wilful" in the Proudfoot case, as they were in the Ruggles
case, although in each the agent was a faithful servant to his master.
By insisting upon some degree of imputation of knowledge England
thus definitely repudiates the Ruggles result. American writers also
repudiate it. After discussing it as maintaining a view contrary to
the Proudfoot decision, W. R. Vance, in 1930, writes that "the doctrine
of the English Proudfoot case seems to have received practically uni-
versal approval from subsequent authorities." '9 9  In 1932, Mr.
Richards accepts it.99a And its doctrine has been made part of the
9 7A New York case made a similar holding in 1812. See note 99 ginfra. This is
far from an assertion that by the imputation doctrine Proudfoot, in England,
knew instantaneously what Rees, in Smyrna, knew. To the bare question:
"Does the principal's actual personal ignorance protect him?," the Proudfoot de-
cision answers no. "The insurer is entitled to assume as a basis of the contract...
that the [insured] will communicate... every material fact of which the assured
has, or in the ordinary course of business ought to have knowledge." It also
makes some answer as to when he "knows". "We think it clear...that it was
[Rees'] duty to communicate... and, looking to the now general use of the electric
,telegraph.. .we think it the duty of the agent to communicate by this speedier
means of communication."
9$If the agent acts properly both in time and in method of notification, whether
or not defects in communication machinery are to be charged to the property
owner or principal is not discussed. If the news is sent on by his or his agent's
private messenger a delay in transit should not extend the period of the prin-
cipal's ignorance. A delay or loss of a mail ship if mail were used, or breakdown or
misdelivery in the telegraph or cable service would furnish a new phase of the
whole problem. The Restatement puts it that if the telegram is delayed and before
receiving it P insures the vessel lost or not lost, P is not affected by A's knowledge.
This is from the illustration to Section 503 and there are no supporting citations.
But if this means that the Monteflore case is to be confined to the agent's wilful
silence, it is discounted by what the Mentefiore opinion itself says about the
agent's negligence.
9 9HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE (2nd ed 1930) 356. Mr. Vance cites
JOYCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1917) 646, 647; I ARNOULD, MARINE INSURANCE (IIth
ed.) § 582: PHILLIPS, INSURANCE. § 549.
99aRichards Insurance 4th ed. 1932 p. 129.
The Ruggles case was attacked in America in 1845 by Judge Duer, who in 2
DUER, INSURANCE, 419 takes a position adverse to Judge Story. Duer, Mr.
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present Marine Insurance Act in England.10  The most recent
American decision repudiates the view that the disqualifying knowl-
edge is merely personal. In Pendergast v. Globe and Rutgers Fire
Insurance Co.10 ' the New York Court of Appeals recently accepted
the possibility of imputation, and conceded that it was not instan-
taneous'02 but depended on "diligence in communicating the fact of
loss." Although these imputation cases concern "lost or not lost"
policies the court in dealing with an antedated fire policy in the El Dia
case considered the imputation problem on substantially the same
aspects.
Where the insuring property owner stands or falls on "his knowl-
edge" his knowledge is not, therefore, so far as the modern views go, a
matter of what he personally does or does not know-at least in the
marine cases. Since Section 503 of the Agency Restatement was not
discussed'03 by the Institute the writer has no authority for stating its
intended scope. But he is willing to assume these marine cases to be
applicable in any inquiry as to when a principal "knows" what his
agent knows" and that Section 503 is not intended to be read merely
in the light of the illustrations under it. Section 116 and Section 503,
Vance quotes. T. Parsons, in Vol. I, page 458 of his MARINE INSURANCE, pub-
lished in 1868, also expressed his dissatisfaction with the Ruggles case. Duer, a
New York lawyer, was familiar with Andrews v. The Marine Ins. Co., 9 Johns.
32 (N. Y. 1812), where the court, assuming the point that the owner, when placing
insurance in New York City might be affected by what the captain knew, put the
case on the captain's diligence in communicating news of the wreck. The strand-
ing occurred on March 26th. The insurance was placed on April 9th, and the
captain brought in his news on the nith. But the court gave judgment on the
policy.
1006 EDW. VII c. 41, § 18.
101246 N. Y. 396, 159 N. E. 183 (1927). The vessel was lost at the time the in-
surance was written but the agent applying for it had not been informed though
the master was diligent. The owner recovered on the policy. See a note in
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1159 which discusses the imputation problem very fully and
cites the cases. A discussion of them would lengthen this paper unduly, and the
subject is merely incidental to its main purpose anyway.
102Supra note ioi, at 399, 159 N. E. at 184. The court cited M'Lanahan v.
Universal Ins. Co., 26 U. S. 170 (1828); Snow v. Merc. Mut. Ins. Co., 61 N. Y. 16o
(1874). In the first case the owner was actually on board the vessel when it was
lost at sea. In the second the failure to use the telegraph cable when the cable
was new in the world was held not to void the policy.
'0See supra note 83.
'
0 4CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE deals generally with Agents of the In-
sured in Vol. I, ch. VIII. At page 1359 in that chapter he discusses the topic of
Section 503 in general terms applicable to all types of insurance. Yet he there
cites the marine cases-of which he prefers the English. He also discusses these
cases as part of his handling of marine insurance, at his pages 2568, and 2595.
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together, seem to mean, therefore that if the ratifying property
owner benefits by his personal ignorance of the fire he does so only
during the interval within which a diligent agent in charge of the
property could not have got information of the loss to him. As
section 503 puts it he "is affected after the lapse of such time as is
reasonable for its (the information's) communication".
If knowledge is to be a factor in the ratification cases, the knowledge
of the self-appointed agent himself offers a neat problem all its own.
If he knows of the fire when he seeks the policy we cannot make the
problem at all. For certainly any ratification would adopt the
"agent's" knowledge. But conceding the property to be existing and
undamaged at the time the "agent" seeks the protection, it is possible
that the self-appointed one, either on his own observation or by
report made to him by those in charge of the property, may learn of
the subsequent fire before the property owner does, and before the
latter seeks to ratify. Is the principal then, at once, subject to
the "agent's" knowledge? If we say yes to this, the ratification dies a
borning. Further, does the doctrine of the Resiatement give the prop-
erty owner the benefit of a communication period during which his
personal ignorance permits ratification when the self-appointed
"agent" is a direct observer of the fire? Does it mean that if the man
in charge of the property, who could have given notice directly
to the owner, sends it, instead, to the self-appointed "agent", who, in
his turn, relays it to the principal, the principal's ratifying time has
been extended?
CONCLUSION
From these intricacies the' writer returns to the doctrine of the
Marqusee Case, permitting ratification after loss and with knowledge,
even personal, of the loss. He has not found it so difficult to believe
that ratification after loss-that is, merely after the fact that loss has
occurred,- is inequitable to the insurer. That the ratification may
be after knowledge has been much more of a tax upon the explaining
processes. Certainly, however, the Marqusee rule makes no such
difficulties of application as does the English view. This much can
be said for it. It is a workable rule. It is followed by American
courts. Aside from the point of the property owner's knowledge, it
can be sufficiently rationalized to meet objection on principle. And
on the point of permitting the ratification even after the knowledge
it meets the instinctive reaction of the layman to the question. Every
colleague to whom I put the problem has felt that it was a case where
the insurer should pay; and in insurance law the layman's point of
view has been progressively prevailing over legalistic logic. In this
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same connection it can be said that if it is at war with the general
doctrines of agency in permitting ratification after known loss, the
answer is that nothing can obscure the fact that insurance law is a
thing apart."0 5 In it more than one "general principle" of contract'
is sacrificed to the realities of the insurance concept as a social device.
To the writer it is not therefore odd that a general principle of agency
should be called upon for the same sacrifice in the American decisions.
105Preface to WOODRUFF, CASES ON INSURANCE, (2nd ed. 1924) p. V.
10See for the discussion of delivery, Patterson, The Delivery of an Insurance
Policy (1920) 33 HARv. L. Rnv. 198. For the judicial devices by which a non-
acceptance of an offer results in substantial contract, see Funk, Duty of an Insurer
to Act Promptly on Applications (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 207. For legislative
devices, see Wanberg v. National etc. Co., 26o U. S. 71, 43 Sup. Ct. 32 (1923)and
comment (i921) i McH. L. REv. 34o.
